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Towards an In-depth Understanding of Deep Packet Inspection Using a
Suite of Industrial Control Systems Protocol Packets
Abstract

Industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to internal and external threats. These
systems are integral part of our nation’s critical infrastructures. Consequently, a successful cyberattack on one
of these could present disastrous consequences to human life and property as well. It is imperative that
cybersecurity professionals gain a good understanding of these systems particularly in the area of
communication protocols. Traditional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) are made to encapsulate some of these ICS protocols which may enable malicious payload to get
through the network firewall and thus, gain entry into the network. This paper describes technical details on
various ICS protocols and a suite of ICS protocol packets for the purpose of providing digital forensic
materials for laboratory exercises toward a better understanding of the inner workings of ICS
communications. Further, these artifacts can be useful in devising deep packet inspection (DPI) strategies
that can be implemented in network firewalls, in expanding challenge materials for cyber competitions, and in
attribution, vulnerability assessment, and penetration testing research in ICS security. We also present
software tools that are available for free download on the Internet that could be used to generate simulated
ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) communication packets for research and
pedagogical purposes. Finally, we conclude the paper by presenting possible research avenues that can be
pursued as extensions to this seminal work on ICS security. Prominent among these possible extensions is the
expansion of the ICS packet suite to include those protocols in the wireless domain such as Wi-Fi (802.11),
Bluetooth, Zigbee, and other protocols that utilizes proprietary Radio Frequency.
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INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to
internal and external threats. These systems are integral to our nation’s critical
infrastructures. Consequently, a successful cyberattack on one of these systems
could present disastrous consequences to human life and property as well. It is
imperative that cybersecurity professionals gain a good understanding of these
systems particularly in the area of communication protocols. Traditional
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are
made to encapsulate some of these ICS protocols which may enable malicious
payload to get through the network firewall and thus, gain entry into the network.
The contribution of this paper is to describe a suite of ICS protocol packets for the
purpose of providing digital forensic materials for laboratory exercises toward a
better understanding of the inner working of ICS communications. These artifacts
can also be useful in devising deep packet inspection (DPI) strategies and tools
that can be implemented in network firewalls. Lastly, we hope that this collection
of captured ICS packets could further enhance cybersecurity education and
training particularly in ICS packet analysis and attribution, vulnerability analysis,
penetration testing, and challenge materials for cyber competitions.
The rest of the paper is organized into three parts. First, we present a literature
review of ICS protocols and technologies, deep packet inspection, and ICS packet
generation and analysis. Second, we provide a technical overview and packet
structure description of the prominent ICS protocols. Furthermore, we examine
the details of a representative sample packet for each protocol and highlighted the
essential components that define each protocol. Finally, we provide concluding
remarks and present possible research avenues that can be pursued as extensions
to this work.

BACKGROUND
Industrial control system protocols range from wired to wireless. Wired
protocols include Ethernet Industrial Protocol (Ethernet/IP), Common Industrial
Protocol (CIP), Modbus, Modbus Transmission Control Protocol (Modbus/TCP),
Distributed Network Protocol version3 (DNP3), Process Field Bus (Profibus),
DeviceNet, Controller Area Network (CAN, 2013), and Ethernet for Control
Automation Technology (EtherCAT). The wireless variety includes
WirelessHART, 802.15 (Bluetooth), 802.16 (Broadband) and IEEE 802.15.4
(Zigbee) (Francia & Francia, 2013). With the ever increasing risk that ICS are
being subjected to, it is imperative that cybersecurity professionals gain a good
understanding of the communication protocols with which these systems operate
and the threats that exist in securing them.
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Deep Packet Inspection
Packet filters found in network devices are the first line of defense against
malicious packets. Deep packet inspection is a small part of the filtering
techniques that are adopted by security providers in their commercial products. A
non-exhaustive list of techniques is presented in (Franz & Pothamsetty, 2004) and
they include the following:


Layer 2 filtering using intelligent switches/bridges;



Access Control Lists on Layer 3 and 4 using routers;



Stateful Firewall filtering;



Application Proxy filtering; and



Deploying DPI and Intrusion Prevention Systems.

Obviously there is a great need for developing filters that are creatively
constructed using DPI and intelligent mechanisms. These filters can then be
applied on fields and values in control systems. These fields might include
register read and write commands, controlled objects, and service requests (Byres,
2016).
Deep Packet Inspection is the process of allowing packet inspecting devices, such
as firewalls and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), to perform an in-depth
analysis of packet contents. This in-depth analysis is much broader than common
technologies in that it combines protocol anomaly detection and signature
scanning to realize its potential (Ramos, 2009). For more comprehensive literature
reviews on various tools and techniques for the development of DPI systems, the
astute reader is referred to the work of (Antonello, et al., 2012).

ICS Protocol Packet Generation and Sources
The collection of ICS protocol packet captures consists of 30 files
representing 12 different ICS protocols that include, among others, CIP, DNP3,
IEC 60870, EtherCAT, Ethernet/IP, Modbus, Hart, and BACnet. While a number
of these files were generated in our Critical Infrastructure Security and
Assessment Laboratory (CISAL) (Francia, Bekhouche, & Marbut, 2011),
additional files came from multiple sources on the Internet and were compiled by
Jason Smith on GitHub (Smith, 2016). Additionally, IEC 60870 packets were
generated using two simulation tools: QTester104 and WinPP104. QTester104 is
an implementation of the IEC60870-5-104 protocol for substation data acquisition
and control over TCP/IP network (Ricardolo, 2016). WinPP104 is another
implementation of the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol for listening and simulation of
tele-control center and substation (Fink, 2016).
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ICS Protocol Packet Capture and Analysis
ICS packet capture and analysis can be accomplished using a freely
available tool called Wireshark (Wireshark 2.0.5, 2016). This network packet
analyzer tool provides a mechanism to drill down into each packet. This is a very
convenient tool to use especially with ICS packets since the control information
is, most likely, encapsulated by the traditional protocol frames such as TCP and
UDP. Furthermore, the Wireshark website provides packet capture samples
(Wireshark Sample Captures, 2016) on a number of popular ICS protocol packets.

ICS PROTOCOLS
The following subsections will provide technical details on various ICS
protocols with emphasis on their specific packet structure. The purpose of
providing these details is to enable the reader to understand and interpret the
information that is being uncovered when doing a deep packet inspection using
Wireshark. However, due to space constraints, we simply provide what we
believe is essential to get started in ICS packet analysis. It is still incumbent for
the reader to follow the references cited within to get a deeper understanding of
each protocol’s technical details.

Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
The Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is a protocol
standard to define communications between Remote Terminal Units (RTU),
master stations, and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). It was originally a
proprietary model developed by Harris Controls Division and designed for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. DNP3 is a
master/slave control system protocol and is an accepted standard by the electric,
oil & gas, waste/water, and security industries (Clarke, Reynders, & Wright,
2004). There are numerous system architectural configurations for DNP3. A
typical multi-drop configuration that includes one master station and multiple
outstation devices is shown in Figure 1.
DNP3
Master

DNP3
Outstation

DNP3
Outstation

Figure 1. A DNP3 Multi-drop System Architecture

DNP3 is a four-layer subset of the OSI 7 layer model. The layers are the
application, data link, physical, and pseudo-transport layers. The pseudo-transport
layer includes routing, flow control of data packets, and transport functions such
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as error-correction and assembly/disassembly of packets (Clarke, Reynders, &
Wright, 2004). The data link header contains two Start bytes (0x0564) that help
the receiver determine where the frame begins. The Length specifies number of
octets of the remainder of the frame excluding the Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) section. The Data Link Control octet is used for the sending and receiving
link layers for coordination (Curtis, 2005). The DNP3 data link frame is depicted
in Figure 2.
HEADER

SYNC
2 bytes

LENGTH
1 byte

DATA SECTION

LINK CONTROL
1 byte

DESTINATION
ADDRESS
2 bytes

SOURCE
ADDRESS
2 bytes

CRC
2 bytes

Figure 2. The DNP3 Data Link Frame

The 2-octet Destination Address specifies which DNP3 device should process the
data, and the 2-byte Source Address identifies the DNP3 device sender. With the
2-byte addressing scheme, there are over 65,500 available addresses in which
every DNP3 device is required to have a unique address for sending and receiving
messages to and from each other. Three destination addresses are reserved by
DNP3 as broadcast addresses. The data payload is divided into blocks with each
block containing a pair of CRC octets for every 16 data octets except for the last
block.
The pseudo-transport layer has the responsibility of breaking long application
layer messages into smaller packets sized for the link layer to transmit, and, when
receiving, to reassemble frames into longer application layer messages (Curtis,
2005). Note that the data link layer can only handle a maximum of 250 data
octets.
The application layer fragments a message depending on the receiver’s buffer size
which ranges between 2048 to 4096 bytes. Consequently, a fragment of size 2048
must be broken into 9 frames by the transport layer before passing on to the data
link layer.
Included in our ICS protocol packet suite is a DNP3 packet capture file with a
write activity. The packet capture file is contributed by B. Wilkerson and can be
found in the Wireshark sample capture repository (Wireshark Sample Captures,
2016). Figure 4 illustrates Wireshark’s Packet List pane which displays the DNP3
packet. Figure 5 provides the details of the DNP3 packet. Particularly of interest
are the Start bytes (0x0564), the source address (0x0003), the destination address
(0x0004), and the function code (0x02).

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2016/iss2/2
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Figure 4. Wireshark Packet List Pane with the DNP3 Pcap File

Figure 5. Wireshark Packet Details Pane with the DNP3 Packet Information

Modbus
Modbus, the most widely deployed ICS protocol, is an application layer
messaging protocol. Transactions can either be a query/response type, where only
a single slave is addressed, or a broadcast/no response type where all slaves are
addressed. The three major implementations of Modbus include:
o Modbus Plus - a high speed token passing network;
o Asynchronous serial communication; and
o Modbus TCP – TCP/IP over Ethernet encapsulation.

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2016
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The Modbus protocol specifies the Protocol Data Unit (PDU), which is comprised
by the function code and the data field, and is independent of the underlying
communication layers. A summary of the most important function codes is shown
in Table 1. Additional fields such as the address and error-check fields augment
the PDU to complete the Application Data Unit (ADU) (Modbus.org, 2012). The
generic Modbus frame is depicted in Figure 6.
FUNCTION CODE

DESCRIPTION

0x01

Read Coils

0x02

Read Discrete Inputs

0x03

Read Holding Registers

0x04

Read Input Registers

0x05

Write Single Coil

0x06

Write Single Register

0x07

Read Exception Status

0x08

Diagnostics

0x0F

Write Multiple Coils

0x10

Write Multiple Registers

0x11

Report Server ID

0x14

Read File Record

0x15

Write File Record

0x16

Mask Write Register

0x17

Read/Write Multiple Registers

Table 1. Modbus Function Code Descriptions

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2016/iss2/2
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Address

Function Code

Data

Error-Check

Figure 6. A Generic Modbus Frame

The single octet Address field identifies the controller/device to which the
request/response is being directed. The single octet Function Code can be any
code from one of these three categories: Public, User-defined, and Reserve
function codes. The Data field contains the information that is being requested,
the exception code, or the information, such as the addresses and number of
registers, which are being passed to the server. The Error-Check field contains the
Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC) information for the ASCII mode and for
the RTU mode, the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) information.
The Modbus organization, Modbus.org, extended the Modbus protocol to work
over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) by encapsulating the Modbus PDU
with the Modbus TCP ADU (Thomas, 2008). This protocol is registered to utilize
port 502 and is realized by augmenting the standard Modbus PDU with a Modbus
Application Protocol (MBAP) header as shown in Figure 7.
MBAP Header
TID

PID

Len

UID Function Code

Data

Figure 7. Modbus TCP ADU

The MBAP Header is made up the following: a two-octet Transaction Identifier
(TID), a two-octet Protocol Identifier (PID), a two-octet total length (Len) in
bytes of the remaining fields, and an octet indicating the Unit Identifier (UID)
which identifies the remote slave connected by a serial line (Modbus.org, 2012).
Our ICS protocol packet suite includes multiple Modbus packet captures utilizing
several of the functions codes shown in Table 1. These packet capture files were
generated in our Critical Infrastructure Security and Assessment Laboratory
(CISAL) and Control System Toolkit. These equipment are shown in Figures 8
and 9, respectively. While Figure 10 shows a listing of the captured packets,
Figure 11 provides the details of the Modbus/TCP packet capture. The detailed
report reveals the port number (502) that is intrinsic to a Modbus/TCP
implementation and the function code that is carried by the transaction.
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Figure 8. The CISAL Laboratory
Toolkit

Figure 9. The Control System

Figure 10. Wireshark Packet List Pane with the Modbus/TCP Pcap File

Figure 11. Wireshark Packet Details Pane with the Modbus/TCP Packet Information

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2016/iss2/2
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IEC 60870.5
IEC 60870.5 is an open standard created by the International
Electromechanical Commission (IEC) for the transmission of SCADA telemetry
control and data (Clarke, Reynders, & Wright, 2004). Of particular interest in this
paper is IEC 60870-5-104, a companion standard which defines the transport of
controls and data of a SCADA system over TCP/IP networks.
A portion of the generic protocol frame structure of the IEC 60870-5-104
companion standard, termed as the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU), is
shown in Figure 12. The Application Protocol Control Information (APCI) is
comprised of the first 6 octets and the remainder of the APDU contains the
Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). The APCI control field can be either one
of the following types: Information, Supervisory, or Unnumbered. These are very
similar to the control fields used in High-level Data Link Control (HDLC), a
synchronous data link layer protocol developed by the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2010). The Control Field
structure for the Information type is shown in Figure 13. The two least significant
bits indicate the type APCI control field, i.e. 10 for supervisory, 11 for
unnumbered, and 0- for information.

Start (0x68)

Length

Control 1

Control 2

Control 3

Control 4

ASDU

Figure 12. Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) Generic Structure

The ASDU structure includes the data unit identifier and the data payload of one
or more information objects. The data unit identifier defines the specific type of
data, the address determines the identity of data, and the Cause of Transmission
(COT). The COT is used to interpret the information received at the destination.
The 8-bit wide code types, shown in Table 2, identify the 58 groups that are
currently defined. Furthermore, information code references, defined in IEC
60870-5-5, are provided in the ASDU. For instance, code type number 9 has
reference code M_ME_NA_1 indicating “Measured value, Normalized value.”
Detailed descriptions of all type group and reference codes are found in (Clarke,
Reynders, & Wright, 2004).
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Send Sequence Number

0

Send Sequence Number
Receive Sequence Number

Control Field 1
Control Field 2

0

Receive Sequence Number

Control Field 3
Control Field 4

Figure 13. Control Field Information Type Structure

CODE TYPE RANGE

GROUP

1-21, 30-40

Process information in monitor direction

45-51

Process information in control direction

70

System information in monitor direction

100-106

System information in control direction

110-113

Parameter in control direction

120-126

File Transfer

Table 2. Code Type Groups

Just like Modbus/TCP is tied to specific port (504), IEC 60870-5-104 is assigned
TCP port number 2404. Thus, deciphering and identifying ICS packets, at least
for these two protocols, would be much easier by focusing on the port numbers
that are being used for communications.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2016/iss2/2
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Our ICS protocol packet suite includes several IEC 60870-5-104 packet capture
files. Figure 14 depicts the ACPI and ASDU components of the packet structure.
Figure 15 provides the details of transmission such as control type, code, transmit
and receive sequence numbers, and reference descriptions. A careful scrutiny of
the information provided would reveal the following information: ASDU type
code 50 with reference C_SE_NC_1 (“Set point command, short floating point
number”), the APCI is Information type with Transmission sequence number 74
and Receive sequence number 16, the cause of transmission (COT) is 3
(Spontaneous), the Information Object Address (IOA) of 12, and a floating point
value of 9.87.

Figure 14. IEC 60870-5-104 Packet List

Figure 15. A Snapshot of IEC 60870-5-104 Packet Details
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EtherNet/IP
EtherNet/Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP) a member of the Common
Industrial Protocol (CIP) provides the network tools to deploy standard Ethernet
technology to enable industrial automation applications and enterprise
connectivity for data and control. This protocol runs over TCP/IP or UDP/IP.
TCP/IP uses the reserved port 0xAF12 (44818) for transmitting explicit messages
while UDP/IP uses the reserved port 0x08AE (2222) for transmitting I/O
messages. A typical Ethernet frame with the encapsulated EtherNet/IP data and
the encapsulated packet format are shown in Figures 16 and 17, respectively
(Schiffer, 2016).

Ethernet
Header

IP
Header

TCP or
UDP
Header

EtherNet/IP
Encapsulation
Header

EtherNet/IP
Encapsulation
Data

Ethernet
Trailer

Figure 16. Ethernet Frame with Encapsulated EtherNet/IP

ENCAPSULATION HEADER

Cmd
2 octets

Len
2 octets

Session
Handle
4 octets

Status
4 octets

Sender
Context
8 octets

ENCAPSULATION DATA

Options
4 octets

Command Specific Data
0-65511 octets

Figure 17. Encapsulation Packet Format

The two-octet command (Cmd) field represents various types of commands such
as broadcast, session opening and closing, and receiving and sending data for
connected and unconnected messaging (Francia & Francia, 2013).

Figure 18. Packet Details of Ethernet/IP over UDP

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2016/iss2/2
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Figure 19. Packet Details of Ethernet/IP over TCP

EtherCAT
EtherCAT stands for Ethernet for Control Automation Technology. It is a
control system protocol that is mainly used to satisfy very high performance
requirements in the manufacturing environment. For a typical 1000 distributed
points the update time is approximately 30 microseconds (Digital Bond, 2016).
The format of an EtherCAT UDP frame is shown in Figure 20. The EtherCAT
telegram consist of one or more datagrams, each serving a particular memory area
of the logical process images of up to 4 GB in size. The EtherCAT telegram
header consists of a length field, a reserve field, and a type field which indicates
the nature of the data carried by the EtherCAT telegram (EtherCAT Technology
Group, 2016). ICS communication messages are transported and encapsulated on
EtherCAT as a UDP payload using port 0x88A4 (34990). EtherCAT is highly
susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) and spoofing attacks due to lack of
authentication (Knapp & Langill, December 2014).
Our ICS protocol packet suite includes an EtherCAT packet capture file
downloaded from the Wireshark sample capture file repository (Wireshark
Sample Captures, 2016). Details of the contents of the EtherCAT telegram are
shown in Figure 21. Points of interest on this EtherCAT packet snapshot are the
following: the Ethernet frame type: EtherCAT (0x88a4), the Broadcast Write
command (BWR) with data value 1100 as the first datagram command, the
Broadcast Read (BRD) starting at slave address 0x0130, and the Auto Increment
Physical Read (APRD) datagram command.
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Figure 20. EtherCAT Telegram Structure with UDP (Digital Bond, 2016)

Figure 21. Packet Details of EtherCAT over UDP

Profibus
Process Fieldbus (Profibus) is an open fieldbus serial network standard,
and is mainly used for real-time control applications. The protocol operates on the
application, data link, and physical layers of the OSI model. Profibus comes in
three forms: Profibus Process Automation (PA), Decentralized Peripherals (DP),
and Profibus Fieldbus Message Specification (FMS) (Krutz, 2006).
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The Profibus DP telegram header (11 bytes) and data field (variable length—
maximum of 244 bytes) is depicted in Figure 22. The header consists of the start
delimiter (SD), the net data length (LE), the length repeated (LEr), destination
address (DA), source address (SA), function code (FC), the destination service
access point (DSAP), the source service access point (SSAP), the frame checking
sequence (FCS), and the end delimiter (ED) (Acromag Incorporated, 2002).

SD
1 octet

LE
1 octet

LEr
1 octet

DA
1 octet

SA
1 octet

FC
1 octet

DSAP
1 octet

SSAP
1 octet

DU
var

FCS
1 octet

ED
1 octet

Figure 22. Profibus-DP (Message) Telegram Structure

ControlNet
ControlNet is a token-passing bus control network protocol that is based
on the IEEE 802.4 standard. The nodes in the token bus network are configured
into a ring topology, and in particular, in ControlNet, each node knows the
address of the preceding and succeeding nodes (Lian, Moyne, & Tilbury, 2001).
The ControlNet protocol became a part of the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP)
family of protocols in 1997.
The Medium Access Control (MAC) frame format transmitted on ControlNet is
shown in Figure 23. The transmitted data, which could be as many as 510 bytes, is
carried by a series of link packets (LPackets). A link packet can either be a Fixed
Tag or a Generic Tag. The Fixed Tag LPackets are used for Unconnected
Messaging and network administration while the Generic Tag LPackets are used
for Connected Messaging. The link data field occupies 506 bytes in the fixed tag
and 505 bytes in the generic tag (Schiffer, 2016).
Preamble

Start
Delimiter

LPacket

Source
Address

LPacket

LPackets

LPacket

...

CRC

Start
Delimiter

LPacket

Figure 23. ControlNet MAC Frame Format (Schiffer, 2016)
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLANS
This paper presented a review of industrial control protocols and the need
for resources towards an in-depth understanding of ICS protocols. We cannot
emphasize enough the fact that a solid understanding of the ICS protocols and
architectures is essential to securing our critical infrastructures. We believe that
this small contribution will provide indispensable materials in three areas of
learning and research on ICS: digital forensics, cyber competitions, and deep
packet inspection.
The challenge for the authors will be in the expansion of the collection of ICS
packet samples to cover the protocols that are just evolving such as those found in
the Internet of Things (IoT) and the automotive controls systems. Additional
future plans include:


Development of an intelligent attribution system utilizing the packet
signature; and



Expansion of the ICS packet samples to include those that utilize the
wireless network protocols.
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